🦞🎬 Decisions & Refuter Rulings

Historical scope: sections 1–2 retain D-134 design rulings and operating rules from 2026-09-20, not a certification that every ruling is implemented or empirically measured today. Old role/config fences describe that mission. D-198 source gaps and dated corrections are in current architecture and Bible errata; sum.yml remains normative. Section 3 records the current consent/safety boundary, while progress holds observed outcomes.

flowchart LR
  Proposal["Initial Design Proposals"] --> Refuters["Adversarial Refuters"]
  Refuters --> Rulings["Refuter Rulings (12 Settled Decisions)"]
  Rulings --> Architecture["Hardened Architecture"]

1. Refuter Rulings (§4.3 SSOT)

Every design choice survived an adversarial refute pass. The twelve rulings are binding:

#Draft ProposedRefuter RulingRationale / Why
1Nav labels = Lot / Slate / Farm / Gates / Crew / CastPlain labels with vernacular eyebrow (e.g. Productions: the lot)Scent test: <90% destination prediction from unfamiliar jargon.
2”Slate clap” animation on Generate buttonCut completely; 100 ms press feedback + Queued ✓ checkmarkMotion must close a question, not decorate.
3The Wall displays live streaming numbersAnimate on state change only, tabular numeralsNo motion at rest; eliminates CPU burn and visual noise.
4Two themes (dark per tab)Single repaired dark theme “dailies”; light mode later as user toggleTheme sovereignty; ensures strict 4.5:1 text and 3:1 control contrast.
5Queue resume = job queue resume onlyGateway rpc respawn + switch_session + get_messages_page replayClosing stdin disposes the omp session; process liveness cannot be assumed.
6”One WebSocket” without keepaliveWebSocket + 20 s daemon ping + REST snapshot on reconnectPrevents Chrome MV3 service worker eviction and iOS timer suspension.
7Shared SQLite SSOT between agent and daemonSQLite for products/shots/jobs; agent files imported; storyflow:// host URIEliminates two-writer drift between daemon and subagent file writes.
8Wall $ metric read from auth brokerCalculated from our own internal job ledgerBroker usage cache has ≤5 min latency plus jitter.
9MCP Apps theme passed via postMessageCustom host bridge; light/dark spec mapping only; structured JSON fallbackMCP Apps spec (2026-01-26) only guarantees light/dark modes.
108 contribution points in plugin manifestReduced to 6 (panels, commands, providers, mediumAdapters, gates, ingredientKinds)YAGNI; cut toolRenderers and ledgerWidgets as tiers cover them.
11Typography = Bricolage Grotesque + IBM PlexDisplay Big Shoulders + Body Hanken Grotesk + Data Commit MonoAvoids generic LLM house aesthetic; fits cinematic title-card style.
12Flow-relay treated as standard providerRequires per-production acknowledgment + rate cap; off by defaultToS risk mitigation against third-party UI driving.

2. Deliverable D-134 Rules & Invariants

The D-134 operating parameters are settled rules and must not be altered:

  1. Workspace Bounds: Working directory /home/loca/dev/storyflow, branch main, initial HEAD b85813ebd023e8c7915d8b0bf88c4a9d95333198.
  2. Untouchable Configuration: .omp/config.yml is committed (Flash for light roles, Pro for heavy roles, maxConcurrency: 6). It must never be edited.
  3. Strict Write Fence: Writes are strictly confined to:
    • /home/loca/dev/storyflow/**
    • ~/.config/systemd/user/storyflow.service
    • /home/loca/dev/wikis/stfl/**
    • /etc/nginx/sites-{available,enabled}/{stfl,wiki.stfl}.loca.zone All other directories on this host are strictly read-only.
  4. Neighbor Fence (D-133): Never touch /home/loca/dev/wrdp, /home/loca/dev/quiz, or wp-cli. Never interact with other live tmux sessions.
  5. Frozen Archives:
    • history/omp-sessions/ is read-only grounding: read for context, never resume or edit.
    • old-flow-files/ is the frozen archive (§9): read-only inspiration; never chmod, chflags, or edit.
  6. Authentication Mandate (“OMP OMP OMP”): Every model, media, and TTS call must route exclusively through omp’s own authenticated providers on this host (antigravity, codex, xai) or through local unofficial wrappers (flow2api). Never use separate paid API keys or borrowed external credentials.
  7. Gateway Port: Assigned to port 7540.
  8. Channel Stubs: External chat channels (Telegram, Discord, iMessage) connect to a stub inbox. Inbound text is strictly treated as data, never as prompt instructions.
  9. Commit & Wiki Cadence: Git commit per move. Current authoring guidance (2026-09-28): content/progress.md is the sanitized public progress summary, not the detailed completion ledger. Detailed milestone history remains protected at content/private/progress.md, intentionally moved in D-164, and is reached through the existing private navigation (sign-in required). Keep the public Quartz ignorePatterns exclusion for private; never copy protected history into the public summary or rewrite dated history. Public updates must separate observed acceptance from work in progress and blockers, with the parity acceptance scenarios governing completion claims. Wiki publication follows the mission owner’s validation and authorization; an authoring update alone does not authorize a rebuild or publish.

D-202 continuation authorization — frozen browser phase, 2026-09-28

D-202 permits loca-hosted headless Chrome strictly through the public app/auth/wiki vhosts, resolved to public IP 178.18.250.170 with normal TLS verification. The separately owned NI10 Chrome has measured genuine pxl sign-in, TLS 1.3, authenticated API responses and WebSocket HTTP101. Its loopback CDP endpoint is control only. The first browser-tooling probe is quarantined because owned NI10 execution and resolver launch arguments were not established. The current continuation records this later permission separately from the immutable D-198 BLOCKED closure below.

The deployed credential source has no supported disposable app-scoped lifecycle. apps/gateway/src/omp-auth.ts requires affirmative global-scope confirmation and uses the shared existing OMP handle; apps/face/src/lib/Credentials.svelte explicitly warns that opening may chmod/migrate storage and login/refresh may persist credentials. Exact-account targeting is not byte-preserving isolation. Existing authentication bytes must be preserved, so no real add/test/update/remove success is accepted here. Metadata inspection and opening/cancelling consent are separate observations, never substitutes for lifecycle completion.

The chosen-provider screen and actual consent Cancel are now browser-observed; the native store remained uninitialized at that screen checkpoint. Public model metadata was requested separately and is not a credential test. Integrity evidence retains an initial unexplained whole-row authentication hash change; a later field-level interval showed unchanged credential data and only a metadata timestamp change. That later result must not be promoted to a claim that the initial full row or all authentication bytes were unchanged.

The native allowance was exactly one continuation of the failed final one-reference/unlocked-seed/8-second video, with unchanged provider/model/settings. Main acquired the NI10 kernel WRITE heavy lease and invoked —execute once. Admission refused checkpoint_clone_changed before confirmation, reservation or provider activity: isolated database/WAL hashes matched but SHM differed, with cause unattributed. The allowance is consumed despite zero provider POSTs/native fetches; no replay, checkpoint repair, rotation, switch or other generation is authorized. It is neither success nor a new HTTP403. The bounded browser/local-media phase is finished; all 41 exact requirements remain in force and Main owns final checks/publication/closure.

A 4K download helper timed out/detached before its asynchronous blob download, and Chrome recorded the default Downloads destination outside authorized evidence roots. That file remains untouched/unremoved: an explicit scope violation, not repaired by the later scoped download of the already-created derivative. Cleanup stayed within supported application operations: 11 owned batches and 23 added shots soft-deleted; six protected Library removals refused HTTP409. Media bytes, productions, stopped jobs and tombstone/undo/log/event residue remain. Original application rows are unchanged, but this does not resolve the separate initial global-authentication hash inequality or justify a zero-residue claim.

This section describes deployed source, not accepted real credential-UI lifecycle. Existing-auth native execution remains four image and three video successes plus one terminal HTTP403 across eight POSTs, without additional native work. Canonical builds/compiler-API smoke and the separate 55-test duration gate pass; no full-project typecheck follows. Owned-service health/all 13 static hashes now independently prove local deployment, not authorized external Chrome/realpxl UI/WS101. All 41 per-item commits/receipts are delivered; the mission remains BLOCKED. Earlier beta/TS7 evidence remains historical contract-violation history.

The Credentials & capabilities page separates broker status from native lifecycle operations:

OperationScope and side effects in candidate source
Read/recheck broker statusRuns the existing read-only OMP broker-status probe. It does not open the native store, log in, refresh tokens or generate. A response is not authentication/entitlement proof; unknown identities, expiry and quota stay unknown. The preserved observation was not_configured.
Read provider metadata before openingLists registered native providers and sanitized status without initializing the shared store. Existing accounts can be shown only after the store has been explicitly opened in that gateway session.
Open shared OMP store / reload accountsRequires an explicit provider and shared-scope confirmation. Opening discovery/storage can chmod or migrate the existing global store. This is not a harmless read-only operation merely because it returns metadata.
Add through native loginUses the selected registered OMP OAuth lifecycle, with browser-owned transient flow and explicit consent. It may persist credentials used by other OMP clients. There is no API-key-entry substitute or independent StoryFlow credential copy.
Test selected credentialSends only the selected durable credential to its admitted authenticated metadata endpoint; it does not rotate accounts, renew an expired credential or generate media. A successful metadata response would not prove generation entitlement. Unsupported tests stay unavailable.
Refresh selected OAuth credentialRefreshes the exact selected durable credential ID through native OMP and can persist global changes. It is not arbitrary API-key replacement.
Remove selected credentialDeletes only that provider’s exact durable credential ID from shared OMP storage. This is not a production-local setting, provider-wide wipe or undoable StoryFlow delete.
Refresh video model capabilitiesBackend source reads public model metadata without auth headers or opening native storage. This is separate from credential testing and does not establish entitlement, billing or frame/seed execution.
Explicit media dispatchResolves authentication through the existing OMP lifecycle only at dispatch; opening/refreshing may mutate the shared native store. The resolved credential is pinned for the attempt; a media failure must not trigger an alternate provider/model/account campaign.

Lifecycle mutations require the exact provider/action, selected account when applicable, affirmative global-scope confirmation, same-origin HTTPS and this browser’s secure HttpOnly session. Native serializers expose masked metadata and exclude credential records from normal snapshots/exports; errors are redacted. This is not proof that arbitrary user-entered prompt text cannot contain a secret, or a complete published-search/media leak audit. These controls do not independently change model configuration.

Native login flow ownership is bound to the browser session and provider; responses must match the pending prompt and OAuth state where supplied. The candidate allows one pending native login, requests cancellation on close, and keeps the login locked until the native operation acknowledges settlement. Leaving the page attempts cancellation but cannot promise delivery. Status failure stops automatic polling rather than inventing success; the user can recheck the same flow. The five-minute flow timeout requests cancellation. Completed flow links and prompts are cleared; authorization URLs and callback responses remain transient.

The original security probe exposed a login started just before the 30-minute browser-session expiry becoming unreachable afterward. Repair renews server lifetime and the same cookie at login start without changing ownership, and cancels flows when their session expires. Matching isolated security-after observes poll 200/cancel 200 after the original expiry: controlled ownership proof, not real shared-store OAuth acceptance. Later genuine dispatch produced four 1376Ă—768 JPEGs and three decoded native videos; image seeds were not applied and image charges remain unknown. The final 403 has no output or retry. None proves credential-manager add/test/update/remove or remote UI acceptance.

Durable submission safety

Candidate queue/media code preserves the selected immutable request, provider, attempt errors and retry eligibility. Safe transient non-429 failures may use bounded per-item backoff. Structured 429 means stop that item, with no automatic/manual retry, re-enqueue or provider switch. Accepted remote output followed by local processing failure, unknown submission outcomes and interrupted running jobs must not become ordinary retryable failures: retain a blocked state and inspect/recover the existing output.

The security-before accepted-output probe disproved this invariant in the earlier candidate. Its matching security-after observes a blocked accepted_media_interrupted item, refused retry and one controlled generation call. Two subsequent defects were also reproduced and then repaired: the media after-probe persists a controlled USD 0.12345 completion as done with one asset and 12 rounded cents from one submission, while changed image input fails as asset_changed before any adapter submission. No unhandled rejection occurs and original source files remain unchanged. The final focused gate passes 52 tests with 287 expectations across four files in 15.19 seconds. Earlier failures remain preserved; controlled remote dependencies are not actual provider acceptance.

Provenance distinguishes selected/submitted/provider-reported model, exact bytes and digest, seed-applied status and measured/estimated/unknown cost. The matching image-input after-probe now refuses changed bytes before submission, repairing the reproduced attribution boundary without inventing an input receipt. Fractional reported USD is rounded to the nearest integer cent with that basis recorded explicitly; the controlled case stores 12 cents, not exact sub-cent billing precision. Stored seeds, route labels, digests and preflight numbers do not independently establish deterministic output, actual billing or a real cloud generation.

Partial-settings mutation boundary

The first native journey exposed Shot/Batch nested PATCH defaults resetting aspect on count-only updates and erasing frame roles on references-only updates. Repair preserves supplied raw keys, merges existing settings and applies the full schema. The recorded actual-HTTP gate passed 6 tests/42 expectations; later native continuation separately observed preservation and mixed-input rejection. The first image was retained without regeneration; three additional images and three videos then completed. Earlier approval timeouts created no jobs. The final same-Shot one-reference/unlocked-seed 1797383276 request persisted/submitted its changed inputs but failed HTTP403 once, with no retry, output or account/provider change.

The two 4-second frame clips and one 8-second reference clip fully decode as 720p/24fps/no-audio H.264. Their 80 + 80 + 160 rounded cents are only the known-video subset, never a mission total: images and the failed request remain unknown. Later 8-second Veo reference-input/1080p/4K enforcement now has 12 controlled actual-HTTP quote cases covering settings refs/direct refs/ingredients/1080p at 4/6/8 seconds. Requested durations stay unchanged; 4/6 block, 8 is eligible, cost remains null/unknown, and no jobs/provider calls/unexpected network occur. A separate permanent HTTP regression verifies invalid confirmation HTTP400 and valid 8-second held work. The final gate is 55 pass/0 fail/359 expectations across four files; native paid proof precedes it. No actual provider 429 or seed determinism is established.

Publication and acceptance

All 41 parity requirements remain in scope; no subset replaces them. Canonical face/source are deployed at fa9ab38a32a4ca805ca882d6480d3173bffc1c7d with local health/static-byte proof and unchanged prior live rows; privately verified rollback material is preserved. REST/assets/WebSocket use public-origin transport; ingress owns authentication, while production scoping is not multi-tenant authorization. Deployment is not authenticated public WS101 or authorized external Chrome acceptance. Real credential-UI lifecycle, text-only native video and successful unlocked/reference-removal output remain incomplete; captions remain unavailable. Final mission verdict: BLOCKED.

This authoring change adds no private content, raw evidence blobs or credential material to public pages. Preserve the existing private-content exclusion from page output, search indexes and assets; retain the protected navigation link rather than copying history. Main alone reconciles final evidence and owns publication.